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Towards a common migration policy: potential
impact on the EU economy
Gudrun Biffl*
There is no simple answer to the question of the potential impact of migration on the
EU economy. EU migration policy is expected to meet the requirements of economic
and social policy, in particular of the Lisbon Agenda, as well as national cultural,
political, strategic and security imperatives. The problem is complicated by different
national traditions in social organisation, which are deeply rooted in history and which
have resulted in different migration models within the EU.
Moreover, what is an issue in its own right is immigration as a tool to counter the
negative impact of population ageing on economic growth and the pressure on public
funds. Another aspect of migration concerns the internationalisation of production and
its contribution to the diversification of the productive structure of the EU and its
member states. Further, migration may also contribute to the growth of the informal
economy, an aspect of concern in member states with large shares of the informal
sector in GDP.
Yet another question to be resolved is the role of migration in the flow of trade in
goods and services within an enlarged Europe and between the EU (25) and the rest
of the world. The distinction between migration and trade in services (mode 4) is
important for judging the impact on the labour market, as the regulatory mechanisms
differ.
The paper addresses all the above issues. As with employment, education and social
policies, a common understanding about the impact of various possible routes of migra-
tion policies on the societies of the member states has to be obtained before entering
a process of policy coordination towards eventual convergence. The paper focuses on
ways in which different policies on various categories of migration Ð labour migration,
family reunification, refugee and asylum-seeker intake Ð and the free movement of
service providers can differentially impact the EU economy, calling for a complex mix
of policy interventions to address the various socio-economic challenges emanating
from them.
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1 Introduction
Immigration gained momentum in the EU in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, slowed down somewhat
in the mid-1990s and picked up again in the late
1990s. The forces driving the pace and pattern of
migration were partly its association with the inten-
sified process of international economic integration
and partly family reunification and humanitarian
programmes.
In Europe, Germany emerges as the principal immi-
gration country, with an annual inflow of 685,000 mi-
grants in 2001 (excluding ethnic Germans)1, fol-
lowed by the UK (373,300), Italy (232,800), Switzer-
land (99,500), the Netherlands (94,500) and Austria
(74,800). In 2001, the annual inflow of migrants into
the EU (15) amounted to 1,465,700 and thus ex-
ceeded the inflow of permanent migrants into North
America (1,314,700) (Table 1). Net immigration is
lower, however, as outflows are also substantial; sig-
nificant cross-border flows are becoming a normal
feature of any modern globalised society.
Some EU member states (Austria, Germany, the
Netherlands and Sweden) have a percentage of im-
migrants at least as high as that of the United States,
i.e. approximately 12 percent of the population
(measured in terms of the proportion of foreign-
born people in the population2)( OECD, 2005A/B).
Luxembourg and Switzerland have even higher
shares, close to or over 20 percent, not dissimilar to
the traditional immigration countries overseas, i.e.
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The percent-
age of foreign-born people exceeds 10 percent in
most old, and in some Southern European member
states (Belgium, France, Ireland, Greece). But also
the new member states in the East are attracting
increasing numbers of migrants, the leading country
being the Czech Republic with 4.5 percent foreign-
born in 2001 (Table 3).
In Western Europe, net immigration has become the
principal component (more than 60 percent) of pop-
ulation growth since the late 1980s.3 A significant
part of immigration is labour migration. In general,
worker flows have tended to increase since the mid-
dle of the 1980s (Tables 2 and 4). Yet labour migra-
1 See Zimmermann (1995).
2 These figures are somewhat higher than those on the basis of
foreign nationality; they provide better insight into immigration
as they are not affected by naturalisation policies, which differ
significantly between EU member states.
3 Immigration is less important in Australia and America, ac-
counting for only a third and a quarter respectively of total popu-
lation growth.
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tion represents the smaller share of migration
flows Ð about 40 percent in the EU (15).4 Family
reunification and refugees account for the major
share of inflows of immigrants into the EU. Foreign
labour, however, plays an important and growing
role in the functioning of labour markets and is sub-
ject to complex institutional regulations, which dif-
fer according to policy targets and migration model.
In what follows, we first take a look at the various
migration models in the EU and the impact of mi-
gration on the labour market. Secondly, we address
the question of the role accorded to migration in
socio-economic development. So far the EU has
tended to give priority to free trade in goods and
services as a tool of economic development rather
than migration. The impact of this policy preference
on the labour market outcomes is analysed in the
context of the eastern enlargement of the EU.
Thirdly, the implications of a free flow of services
mode 4 for economic policy are considered in the
context of the limited capacity of member states to
regulate the inflow of third-country unskilled mi-
grants who are in the main family members with the
right to family reunification, and refugees. In the
concluding section, the potential role of migration
in achieving the Lisbon objectives is touched upon
in the light of an increasing fragmentation of indus-
trial production and provision of services. The latter
will represent a major challenge for the implementa-
tion of national/regional adjustment policies.
This paper does not assume that the EC will under-
take revolutionary reforms in the area of services
mobility but rather that it will resort to a gradual
coordinated reform process in an endeavour to pre-
serve the European Social Model. Nor does it as-
sume that the transition agreements between west-
ern EU countries, in particular member states shar-
ing borders with the new member states in Central
and Eastern Europe, will be abandoned in the short
to medium term. Instead, we base our paper on the
vision of Europe developed by the European Coun-
cil at its Lisbon Summit in March 2000, i.e. a Europe
which aspires to become the most competitive
knowledge economy in the world by 2010. Immigra-
tion will play a role in the Lisbon Agenda, in partic-
ular by increasing the inflow of highly skilled mi-
grants to speed up the re-skilling process of the Eu-
ropean workforce towards a knowledge society in
an information age.
4 It is even smaller in the USA at some 20 percent.Gudrun Biffl Towards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy
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2 Convergence of migration policies
in the EU
As the EU moves beyond a single market towards
a common European social system and labour mar-
ket, policy coordination will need to encompass not
only employment, education and social policy but
also migration policy, as acknowledged in the Com-
mission Green Paper (EC 2005). By coordinating
migration policy, the EU seeks to raise the skill com-
position of the workforce, increase the flexibility of
labour markets (speed of adjustment to fluctuations
in labour demand) and to reduce the negative im-
pact of population ageing. At the same time, inte-
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gration measures, based on liberal democratic val-
ues, will need to be applied to reinforce economic,
social and political stability by preserving social co-
hesion across the EU.
Migration policy reform will have to take into ac-
count the history of migration in the various mem-
ber states, i.e. acknowledge the path dependence of
change. In order to gain insight into the challenge
of policy coordination in the field of migration, an
overview of the major migration models in place in
the EU (25) is warranted. At least three systems
may be identified, with different focal points of mi-
gration policy. Each has preserved its basic structureTowards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy Gudrun Biffl
and orientation, even though a certain convergence
in migration policy has taken place since the 1980s.
 The Nordic model:
This was introduced as early as 1954 and featured
free mobility of labour for its citizens within Scan-
dinavia. The understanding was that economic
gains could be maximised by regional integration,
i.e. by going beyond free trade and allowing the
free mobility of both factors of production, capital
and labour. Sweden became a net importer of la-
bour from other Scandinavian countries, in partic-
ular from Finland, during its industrialisation
phase in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, the net in-
flow of migrants from Finland abated as the latter
managed to catch up with Sweden in terms of fac-
tor prices and productivity.
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Immigrants from third countries were rare until
the mid-1980s, since the Nordic countries did not
adopt temporary migration programmes on a
large scale but implemented incentive mecha-
nisms instead, which were to raise the activity
rates of their native populations.5 As international
refugee flows increased in the 1980s, however, the
Nordic countries accepted significant numbers of
refugees, becoming the major source of immigra-
tion in the 1990s and early 2000s, together with
family reunification; the Nordic country with the
highest intake of immigrants is Sweden, with
5 Today, the Nordic countries have the highest activity rates in
Europe, while they were not dissimilar from the rest of Europe
in the mid-1960s. This shows that policy reform to meet the re-
quirements of the labour market in a situation of population age-
ing is possible and produces the expected results.Gudrun Biffl Towards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy
12 percent of the population being foreign-born in
2001, followed by Norway with 7.3 percent and
Denmark with 6.8 percent; Finland has the small-
est proportion of foreign-born inhabitants,with
2.5 percent. The proportion of EU citizens from
other countries in the total population is compara-
tively small, the levels being comparable to the
EU average; the proportion of EU citizens is
highest in Norway (2.3 percent), followed by
Sweden (2 percent). The majority of non-native
EU citizens residing in a Nordic country are citi-
zens of another Scandinavian country. The largest
number lives in Sweden (some 170,000 in 2001),
i.e. 1.8 percent of the total population (2/3 from
Finland). The other Scandinavian countries have
even smaller proportions of citizens of another
EU country residing on their territory (Table 3;
for more details see Biffl 2001A).
 The temporary worker model:
This migration model originated in Switzerland
and was adopted by founding members of the Eu-
ropean Community, the most prominent example
being Germany, as well as by EFTA countries, the
most important one in terms of migration flows is
Austria. The EFTA countries gave priority to free
trade rather than free labour mobility as an eco-
nomic development tool. Migration focused on
meeting perceived temporary labour needs and
was meant to increase the flexibility of the labour
market; an increase in the size of the population
through permanent migration was not the objec-
tive.
The temporary worker model allowed larger in-
flows of migrants than the Nordic model and also
the third immigration model, which was the result
of colonial ties and/or cultural/ethnic or other
strategies. As it turned out, the majority of tempo-
rary migrants settled, putting pressure on the re-
ceiving countries to develop integration policies to
avoid creating a permanent underclass which
could jeopardise social cohesion.
Today, the countries which adopted the temporary
migration model have the highest shares of immi-
grants in their populations, Switzerland taking the
lead with 22.4 percent foreign-born, followed by
Germany and Austria with 12.5 percent. While
EU citizens represent the bulk of immigrants in
Switzerland, they are only a minority in Germany
and Austria (less than 2 percent of the popula-
tion). Targeted immigration to meet labour mar-
ket needs has become a comparatively small part
of immigration, while family reunification and ref-
ugee intake have become the major source.
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The new member states in the East have ceased
to be major source countries of migrants both to
Western Europe and the rest of the world as they
have entered a favourable long-term economic
growth path; as their economies are catching up,
they are increasingly attracting third-country mi-
grants. In order to gain some control over migra-
tion flows, they adopted a migration policy mod-
elled after the foreign-worker model of Switzer-
land, Germany and Austria (Lubyova 2001).
 Immigration resulting from colonial and/or cul-
tural/ethnic ties, or other political strategies:
The third immigration model is the result of colo-
nial ties as in the case of Great Britain, France,
the Netherlands, Belgium and, more recently, Por-
tugal. This model is unlikely to produce massive
migratory flows in the future. However, a steady
flow of immigrants from these regions may be ex-
pected to continue to enter into their respective
EU member states because of former ties. In
terms of a migration policy framework, it is help-
ful to think of this type of immigration as receiv-
ing preferential treatment with the potential of
unexpected large inflows.
The substantial immigration of ethnic Germans
(Aussiedler), Pontean Greeks from Central and
Eastern European countries, and Ingrians from
the Baltics to Finland, often labelled as ‘return’
migration, may also be included in this type of mi-
gration model, as this group of immigrants tends
to receive preferential treatment in the receiving
countries. These latter flows have to be seen in the
light of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the ensu-
ing socio-economic re-integration of Europe.
The countries in this third group of migration
models represent the bulk of the member coun-
tries of the former European Community. With
some 10 percent foreign-born in their populations
around 2001, they tend to be at the upper end
of the range of immigration in the EU, whereby
Germany has a somewhat larger share and the
UK a smaller one (8.3 percent).
Even though free mobility of labour between
member states has in principle been possible in
the private and public sector in the European
Community since 1968, only a small proportion of
EU citizens reside in a different member state of
the old European Community, i.e. some 2 percent
of the respective populations, with the exception
of Belgium. As Belgium is the major seat of EU
administration, it should not come as a surprise
that it has a large number of citizens from other
EU countries.Towards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy Gudrun Biffl
The main reasons behind migration differ between
the various models, affecting the timing, direction,
volume and composition of immigration. However,
the migration models have converged and became
more complex over time, particularly since the
1980s. Traditional immigration countries like France
introduced short-term labour migration pro-
grammes while temporary migration countries like
Germany implemented settlement programmes. As
a result, the distinction between basically two types
of immigration, settlement versus short-term migra-
tion, by country is no longer applicable in Europe.
The limited mobility of EU citizens within the EU
is a matter of concern to some policy-makers as it is
seen as a potential threat to economic and produc-
tivity growth and one reason for the sustained large
pockets of unemployment. It suggests that the costs
of mobility between member states are substantial.
These arise for various reasons, for example the
need to overcome language and cultural barriers,
the limited portability of various social security
rights, in particular pension rights, the problem of
recognition of skills and competences across bor-
ders, and a limited understanding of the functional
mechanisms of the various labour markets represent
additional barriers, particularly for individuals with
non-standardised skills. This explains why migrants
tend to be at the lower and upper ends of the skill
spectrum, where the international transferability of
skills is relatively easy.6
The planning and control of migration flows has be-
come increasingly difficult, given the rights to family
reunification, to refuge and to settlement after a cer-
tain period of legal residence. While there is the gen-
eral belief on the part of policy-makers that migra-
tion flows are mainly determined by the demand of
receiving countries, the reality is that the sometimes
massive movements of people would hardly occur in
the absence of push factors, i.e. emigration pressure
from source countries. The increase in refugee
movements since the 1980s stems from the simulta-
neous presence of political and environmental push
factors in the source countries and economic pull
factors in the receiving countries. The migration
pressure from poor to rich countries is increasing,
encompassing a larger number of countries (nation-
alities, ethnicities) of emigration and a larger num-
ber of destination countries including emigration
countries. Apart from pull and push factors, chain
migration ensures a continued flow of migrants
building on family reunification and migration net-
6 For a more detailed account of the degree of transferability of
skills see Biffl (2001B).
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works. Immigration has ceased to take place solely
in countries and regions of low unemployment and
is now a common feature also in high-unemploy-
ment regions like Spain and the new member states
in Central and Eastern Europe. Economic links and
technology have created a transnational space for
the mobility of capital and created new conditions
for the mobility of labour.
So far, Europe has tended not to pick the brains of
the world in its migration policy, giving priority to
the education and training of its own population and
supplementing its workforce at the lower end of the
skill spectrum. The Lisbon Agenda, however, intro-
duces a new feature to European migration policy,
i.e. a strategy to raise the inflow of highly skilled
migrants from outside the EU. In the global market
of the highly skilled, the EU will have to compete
with other developed countries, in particular Ca-
nada, Australia and USA, for highly skilled immi-
grants. It will have to bear in mind that it may lose
some of its own highly skilled to the rest of the
world in the course of globalisation while managing
to attract highly skilled persons from other parts of
the world. In 2001, the difference between the num-
ber of highly skilled emigrants and highly skilled im-
migrants has been positive for a number of EU
member states, with France and Germany taking the
lead, followed by Spain, Sweden, the UK and Bel-
gium. However, the major winners in the highly-
skilled market are the overseas countries USA,
Canada and Australia. The largest proportions of
highly skilled immigrants (university graduates) in
the highly skilled workforce of the recipient country
can be found in Australia, Luxembourg, Switzer-
land, Canada, USA and New Zealand, with more
than 20 percent (OECD 2005A/B).
3 The impact of migration on the
economy and the labour market
Even though migration may be the result of a vari-
ety of factors, the challenge of migration policy in
Europe has been to strike a balance between eco-
nomic efficiency and equity, between social and hu-
manitarian objectives and political stability. Popula-
tion ageing has added another dimension, as a result
of which Europe is taking to immigration as a popu-
lation policy.
Economic impact analyses of migration tend to fo-
cus on overall monetary effects which are the result
of market transactions. Many aspects which affect
the material well-being of society but do not operate
through the formal market economy are neglected.Gudrun Biffl Towards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy
The research results tend to acknowledge a positive
net overall economic effect of immigration upon Eu-
ropean societies, but do not identify the distribution
of such gains across all members/groups of society.
The impact of migration on economic growth de-
pends on how productivity and the labour market
are affected. These effects would vary between
member states depending on their particular migra-
tion model and its resulting composition of migrants
in terms of age, gender and especially skills relative
to the native population. Furthermore, the con-
sumption basket of migrants, their savings behav-
iour and their investment patterns (remittances to
source countries versus creation of jobs in the re-
ceiving country) may differ in many respects from
the national average. These differences may be ex-
pected to affect economic growth as well as import-
export relationships and the current account.
Productivity may be positively affected by a higher
mobility of migrants compared to natives. This no-
tion is at the heart of the decision in favour of the
‘guest worker’ model of migration. Temporary work
permits enable migrants to be placed where they are
most efficiently deployed. Permanently settled mi-
grants tend to be less mobile regionally, thus reduc-
ing the potential for productivity increases from this
source. Another aspect which impacts upon produc-
tivity is the skill structure of immigrants. Above av-
erage skills go hand in hand with higher wages and
better employment opportunities for such immi-
grants, thereby contributing to a rise in GDP per
capita. The opposite holds for migrants with low
skills or with skills which become increasingly obso-
lete with technical progress. As Europe has largely
taken in unskilled and semi-skilled migrants, the
skill structure as such has not promoted productivity
growth. However, economies of scale as a result of
migrant worker intake as well as a more efficient
use of skilled native workers, together with the ex-
tension of markets through international trade, have
clearly aided economic and productivity growth.
The impact of migrants on the labour market de-
pends on the migration model and the role that mi-
gration plays in the economic development process.
In general, immigrants tend to be concentrated in
labour market segments which are generally not fa-
voured by the resident workforce. The extent to
which this takes place also depends on labour mar-
ket regulations.
In the case of the temporary worker model, mi-
grants are brought in mainly to enhance the compet-
itiveness of export industries. Migrants are thus
channelled into industries which produce tradeables,
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e.g. manufacturing with a low capital-to-labour ratio,
in particular, labour-intensive industries like cloth-
ing, leather and textiles as well as tourism. To a
lesser extent migrants flow into non-tradeables, in
particular construction, personal, health and domes-
tic services. The latter three services tend to have
limited possibilities for rationalisation and thus for
productivity growth in the technical sense, e.g. the
patient/nurse ratio cannot be reduced by technology
to the same extent as business-oriented services or
the production of manufactured goods, if the quality
of the service is to be preserved.7
The rationale for employing migrant workers is
based on wage and/or unemployment effects of mi-
grants relative to natives. In summary, it can be said
that the pressure on wages and employment oppor-
tunities increases with the elasticity of substitution
of migrant versus resident labour. This is to say that
in occupations and jobs in which migrants are com-
plementary to natives, natives profit from migrant
labour in terms of job opportunities and relative wa-
ges. In contrast, in jobs where migrants and natives
are substitutes, the wages and employment of na-
tives are adversely affected.8
Immigrants also impact on the income distribution.
Research indicates that migration has contributed to
a rise in unemployment and/or a widening of wage
differentials in skill segments in which migrants are
concentrated and which face a decline in relative de-
mand, i.e. where as a result of immigration labour
supply growth outpaces labour demand growth
(Faini et al. 1999). In the EU, immigration tends to
result in a redistribution of income away from un-
skilled and secondary workers towards highly skilled
professionals and property owners. The redistribu-
tion process is limited in situations of full employ-
ment and solidaristic wage policies. In phases and
regions where labour resources are underutilised,
however, concentrations of immigrants may be a
concern, particularly in the absence of adequate la-
bour-market and social policy to counter depriva-
tion and poverty of the jobless.
Earlier generations of immigrants entered labour
markets during phases of rapid industrialisation with
rising labour demand for low and medium skilled
workers. Today de-industrialisation and the expan-
sion of service activities affects both the sectoral and
occupational composition of employment as well as
7 As early as 1967, Baumol referred to the ,cost disease‘ of la-
bour-intensive services which are resistant to rationalisation, par-
ticularly when wage increases keep pace with those in manufac-
turing industries and business services.
8 For a review of literature on this issue see Pollan 2000.Towards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy Gudrun Biffl
the skill content. In the absence of a comprehensive
system of continued learning and reskilling, an over-
supply of labour with obsolete skills began to build
up in the early 1990s. The oversupply did not always
show up in unemployment because it was the source
of labour in casual and part-time employment, mar-
ginal occupations and fringe self-employment out-
side the core economy at lower wages. Self-employ-
ment among migrants is a relatively new feature in
the countries with a dominant temporary work
model, e.g. Austria and Germany, whereas it has
been a normal feature of migrant work in settlement
countries like France and the UK for some time
(Blume et al. 2003).
A new feature of immigration emerged in the 1990s
as rising numbers of illegal migrants entered the EU
who endeavoured to improve their economic situa-
tion by migrating even if it meant working in the
informal sector (Ghosh 1998, 1999). The existence
and rise of the production of goods and services in
the informal sector and the creation of jobs and in-
comes in the non-observed economy in the EU may
in fact promote illegal migration (OECD 2002A,
ILO 2002)9 (Graph 1). The growing share of in-
formal labour in total employment is associated with
the introduction of measures to raise labour market
flexibility, e.g. casual and contract labour. The in-
struments are compatible with what already prevails
in the informal economy Ð workers employed by
informal enterprises, domestic workers, outworkers,
homeworkers, part-time and casual workers Ð and
thus facilitate movement from one economy to the
other. Migrants play an important role in the in-
formal sector, particularly in countries where access
to formal-sector jobs is difficult due to quota regula-
tions and other institutional barriers to entry.
Even though the European models of migration
have so far not been successful in attracting large
numbers of skilled immigrants from third countries,
the skill composition of migrants has become some-
what bipolar, particularly since the 1990s. Highly
skilled migrants tend to be concentrated in business-
oriented services, above all in banking and insur-
ance, in the information-communication technology
sector, in utilities (above all in electrical engineer-
ing), as well as in education and research. Their in-
flow has to be seen in the context of deregulation of
the services sector. The general understanding is
that the inflow of highly skilled migrants, which until
now has been more a result of liberalising market
9 The ILO claims that the bulk of new employment in recent
years, especially in transition countries, has been in the informal
sector (ILO 2002, 1).
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access than of successful reorientation of migration
policy, will have adverse effects on the earnings of
competing workers, regardless of whether they are
native or foreign-born (Borjas 2005, OECD 2002B,
Biffl 2002). It will, however, contribute to Europe’s
productivity and economic growth, thereby moving
along the roadmap of the Lisbon Agenda. As to the
unskilled and semi-skilled migrants, they continue to
flow in large numbers not least because of family
reunification and refugee intake. Their employment
opportunities are declining as whole segments of
manufacturing production are relocated to CEECs.
They contribute to the increasing surplus of un-
skilled workers who turn to the growing services
sector for employment but are often unable to com-
pete due to the lack of necessary skills. As a result,
they increasingly turn to working on their own ac-
count, or join the ranks of the unemployed and so-
cio-economically excluded.
4 The single market and Eastern
enlargement: why trade took prece-
dence over migration
Economic integration in Europe in the 1990s as well
as globalisation at large, have been associated with
increased international mobility of capital but less
so of labour (Solimano 2001). This may be the result
of a general view that trade has mainly positive con-
sequences, while migration gives rise to increased in-
equalities and results in winners and losers. This
view is reflected in the fact that countries tend to
impose restrictions on labour mobility while at the
same time removing barriers to the free flow of
goods and services across borders (GATS), thus dis-
criminating against labour mobility in favour of in-
ternational trade. This raises the question as to
whether this belief is in fact valid, i.e. that trade and
migration have different impacts on economic
growth, the labour market, prices and income distri-
bution. As it turns out, the answer that theory pro-
vides is inconclusive as to the net effect. Only empir-
ical research can establish what the net effect is. De-
pending on a variety of factors including compara-
tive advantage, the net effect may vary between
countries and regions (Samuelson 2004, Swenson
2005, AndersenÐSorensen 2005).
In the context of the impact of migration versus
trade in Europe, it is worthwhile to analyse the poli-
cies chosen and their consequences. With the open-
ing up of the CEECs at the beginning of the 1990s,
a significant increase in trade and a substantial in-
crease of FDI, primarily to the neighbouring transi-
tion countries, took place. But there was compara-
tively little migration.Gudrun Biffl Towards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy
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In contrast, the implementation of the single market
and the single currency has not given a significant
boost to the labour mobility of EU citizens within
the EU, but instead to intra-EU trade and trade with
third countries. In the 1990s, intra-EU (15) trade re-
mained fairly stable at around 60 percent of all EU
trade. However, trade between the EU (15) and
CEECs increased from about 3 percent of all trade
outside the EU (15) in the early 1990s to some
8 percent in 2003. Both increased intra-EU (15)
trade and extra-EU (15) trade were of equal impor-
tance for the substantial boost in the international
trade of the EU (15). From 1993 to 2003, the share
of imports/exports of goods and services as a per-
centage of GDP increased from 27 percent to almost
40 percent (Graphs 2 and 3).
Similarly, the share of EU citizens living and work-
ing in another EU country remained fairly stable at
a very low level during the 1990s Ð on average 2
percent of the population/workforce; whereas mi-
gration from CEECs increased initially after the fall
of the iron curtain, but was prevented from rising
further in the mid- to late-1990s by legal restrictions
on access to formal EU labour markets. Within the
EU, Germany has offered the largest quota of tem-
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porary work to migrants from CEECs. This restrict-
ive migration policy of the EU is in stark contrast
to policy in the traditional immigration countries
overseas, particularly Australia and Canada, which
were and still are reaching out to citizens of CEECs,
particularly highly skilled ones, to settle abroad.
This raises the question of why trade was given pre-
cedence over migration in the context of eastern en-
largement. Research into trade and industry special-
ization in the enlarged European trading zone
shows the following facts: the relatively high educa-
tional attainment level of the workforce and the
complex and advanced manufacturing base of the
CEECs, the huge differences in wages at all skill lev-
els in EU member states compared to the transition
countries, and low transportation costs due to the
geographic proximity. These facts opened up oppor-
tunities for lower production costs against which no
immigration scenario of the EU (15) could compete.
The opening-up of CEECs had in effect suddenly
reduced the competitiveness of various stages of
manufacturing production in the West, which could
hardly be matched by increasing migration at theTowards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy Gudrun Biffl
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going wage levels and the current technological
level. A more promising way for producers to maxi-
mise economic gains was to outsource certain ele-
ments of production. This allowed the EU to take
advantage not only of the significantly lower wages
and the production potential in transition countries,
augmented by foreign direct investment, but also to
access their markets. The specialisation in produc-
tion on either side of the border and the resulting
increase in inter- and intra-industry trade increased
both economic and productivity growth, with little
labour movement.
Thus, the policy rationale in favour of trade rather
than migration was an economic one. Migration was
promoted only where complementarity between
trade and migration was obvious, for example,
where highly skilled labour moved with FDI, in par-
ticular professionals and managers.
As a result, in the course of the 1990s, labour-inten-
sive production lines requiring low to medium skills
were relocated from West to East, while high-skill
labour-intensive and capital-intensive production
expanded in the West. This process of vertical frag-
mentation of production exploits comparative ad-
vantages more intensively than intra- and inter-in-
dustry trade both within the EU (15) as well as be-
tween the EU (15) and developing countries. This
process of fragmentation induces productivity in-
creases, not only from specialisation and economies
of scale, but also from differences in technology and,
of course, wages.10 Thus, fragmentation occurs to
take advantage of factor price differences between
countries with different endowment structures
(Heckscher-Ohlin model) and with a different com-
parative advantage resulting from technological dif-
ferences (the Ricardian motive for trade). In addi-
tion, scale economies and economies of specialisa-
tion in component production may have induced
outsourcing, the latter being the focus of attention
of new trade theory.
As a result of the international fragmentation of
production, the pattern of output and trade changes
in the countries involved in the production process.
This has important effects on employment and its
composition by industry, occupation and skills as
well as on wages. Relative factor demand increases
for those factors that are intensively used in the ex-
panding sectors and decreases for those factors in-
tensively used in declining sectors. It should be
10 For a detailed account of the fragmentation of industrial pro-
duction in Austria see Egger et al. (2001), for a more global view
see ArndtÐKierzkowski (2001).
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noted that the outsourcing of labour-intensive
phases of production has the same effect as sector-
specific skill-biased technical change in that it redu-
ces the demand for low-skilled relative to highly-
skilled labour. It shows up as a rise in sector produc-
tivity without capital deepening, i.e. technological
advance is not the driving force behind productivity
growth. Thus, by setting unskilled labour free, frag-
mentation has a similar effect to technical progress.
Fragmentation is not only factor-saving but also
cost-saving, allowing the price of the final product
to be lowered and/or profitability to be raised. By
reducing the wages of unskilled workers relative to
highly skilled workers, a substitution away from the
more expensive highly skilled to the now cheaper
low skilled workers may take place, thus increasing
their employment. Whether the factor-saving effect
or the substitution effect dominates, is an empirical
question. The reduction in production costs will,
however, raise the competitiveness of the product in
the world markets. This may promote output growth
and contribute to employment growth, offsetting the
job losses resulting from fragmentation.
As labour migration did not change much during the
1990s, the labour market outcomes of the EU (25)
are largely the result of the interaction of labour and
product markets. In the case of Austria, Egger et al.
(2001) show that the overall effect of outsourcing to
CEECs on the volume of employment was compara-
tively large while, given the limited downward flexi-
bility of wages, the impact on relative wages was rel-
atively small. The welfare gains from outsourcing
would have been greater if a reallocation of labour
from declining to growing sectors had been possible.
In a more general analysis AndersenÐSorensen
(2005) point out that a high degree of international
integration of product markets is inevitably linked
with greater wage inequality, irrespective of whether
countries are similar or not. The arguments put for-
ward by Samuelson (2004) are in the same vein.
Given that increased trade is welfare-enhancing
overall, equity considerations suggest that policies
may need to be applied to compensate the losers
from increased internationalisation. This could take
various forms Ð reskilling, providing incentives for
employers to employ more unskilled workers, and
earned income tax credits to raise the income of the
working poor.Towards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy Gudrun Biffl
5 Implications of the international
fragmentation of the provision of
services
A new feature of worker movements, which can be
expected to grow in importance, is the flow of tem-
porary workers as service providers. The EU objec-
tive is to promote further free movement of services
between the member states (COM 2004/002 final Ð
2004/0001 COD, i.e. the so-called Bolkestein Direc-
tive). Although this would boost the temporary
movement of natural persons across borders, it
would feature as trade promotion rather than em-
ployment and labour market policy.
While gains from such services-sector reform may
be substantial and possibly comparable to economic
gains from the earlier commodity trade liberalisa-
tions, a note of caution is called for. The services
sector is huge Ð accounting for more than half of all
jobs in any EU member state and on average close
to 70 percent of GDP in the EU Ð, and so is its
degree of complexity. It encompasses not only pri-
vate sector services but a large number of public sec-
tor services, including education, health and social
services, in essence what may be referred to as the
European Social Model. Without venturing into the
complexities of the current debate in Europe and,
indeed, the rest of the world (Winters et al. 2003,
OECD 2002C, Drake-Brockman 2003)11, it has to
be borne in mind that public services suffer from
“cost disease”, in particular in education, health, so-
cial and cultural services. Due to limits to rationali-
sation, these services become relatively more expen-
sive compared to goods and services more amenable
to productivity growth. Health, education, social
and cultural services are to a large extent provided
by the public sector, often in cooperation with
NGOs and NPOs (non-profit organisations) that
promote welfare and social cohesion, one of the pil-
lars of the Lisbon process.
In this connection, any reform in the provision of
these kinds of services across borders will need to
be based not only on providing easy access and qual-
ity for the benefit of consumers but also on ensuring
decent working conditions for the service providers.
It was above all concern for the quality of the ser-
vice provided Ð and potential market failure Ð
which was at the origin of the state taking over the
regulation of social services. This concern is manifest
in several ways Ð in industrial relations and labour
11 Increased services mobility is on the WTO agenda in the con-
text of GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services).
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market regulation, affecting working conditions, the
professionalisation of work through human capital
investment, and through the impact of welfare servi-
ces by regulating access to service providers where
the quality of the service may be at risk.
In the face of widely differing systems of welfare
and social policy (Biffl 2004), the concern about the
present Bolkestein Directive is that it allows service
providers to move across the border temporarily, on
the basis of inferior terms of employment to those
in the receiving country, as the terms of employment
of the country of origin are meant to apply. This
conflicts with labour migration regulation requiring
migrant workers, temporary or permanent, to be
employed on the terms, including welfare provisions,
applying to other workers in the host country. In
addition, labour supply increases in skill segments
and occupations with above-average unemployment
are not to be exacerbated by immigration; this is
the reason for requiring employers to prove that no
resident worker with the necessary skills is willing to
do the job at the going wage and under the current
working conditions, before an employment permit is
granted to third-country migrants, i.e. the domestic
employer wishing to recruit from abroad, has to un-
dertake an employment test.
The basis of the concern of EU member states vis-
a `-vis the liberalisation of general services mobility is
that the protection of worker rights will be difficult
if not impossible in the case of the temporary move-
ment of natural persons who provide a service in
another country, given their limited knowledge of
legal provisions across member states.12 It is the re-
ceiving country, not the sending country, which has
an incentive to ensure that health and safety regula-
tions, consumer and worker protection legislation
and human rights are observed. As long as welfare
and social security systems are not harmonised, im-
plementation of the country of origin principle will
be difficult. The liberalisation of services mobility
will require cooperation across many parts of gov-
ernment within and between member states, inte-
grating the social partners and other interest groups.
The EU experience will be monitored closely by the
rest of the world, as services mobility mode 4 is high
up on the WTO agenda, with the objective of ex-
tending service provision beyond the current move-
12 The ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) and the
CEEP (European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participa-
tion) challenge the primacy of the internal market over other ele-
ments of Community Law, in particular the ,acquis communitaire‘
regarding legislation concerning labour, consumer protection and
services of general interest. http://wwwetuc.org/a/381, last modifi-
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ment of highly skilled service providers to include
low-skilled services.
Before discussing the potential impact of migration
on society, it is helpful, from an analytical point of
view, to clarify the present somewhat muddled pic-
ture arising from different regulatory regimes apply-
ing to the issue of the temporary movement of natu-
ral persons as service providers. In the EU, the mi-
gration of persons from third countries is regulated
by institutions in the receiving countries, on matters
as diverse as the right of residence, access to the
labour market (in the case of temporary migrants
mostly on the basis of employment tests) and social
and integration policies. In contrast, trade in services
of mode 4 (movement of natural persons to the
country of the consumer) is in the main a financial
issue (payment of a service or a salary based on
transfer price rules between the client/consumer and
the supplier). However, frequently, labour market
authorities do not distinguish between services mo-
bility, where individuals are providing intra-com-
pany services, and migration, where individuals are
transferred to take up employment in the host coun-
try. In both cases employment tests are not applied.
This is where the issues are muddled. Intercompany
transferees, i.e. employees of a foreign enterprise
with a commercial presence in the country where
the service is offered, will provide a temporary ser-
vice while remaining under the direction of the en-
terprise in the country of origin. Others, constituting
the majority of highly skilled professionals and man-
agers in multinational enterprises, move between
parent and affiliate companies in foreign countries,
receive their salary from the receiving or sending
enterprise, depending on administrative procedures
in the receiving country. The numbers of third-coun-
try migrants under these arrangements are small,
and as such are of limited concern for immigration
policy-makers. However, this may change if free mo-
bility of services is extended to foreign temporary
work/personnel leasing agencies for virtually any
kind of service. In those circumstances, migration
and labour market policy-makers may find it in-
creasingly difficult to plan short and medium-term
migration flows in response to labour market needs.
Where large differences in wages and working con-
ditions exist between the country of the foreign ser-
vice provider and the receiving country, the pressure
on wages and working conditions in the receiving
country can be expected to increase if the service
provider is not bound to the working conditions and
wages of the host country but to those of the country
of origin. This will be a priority issue to be deter-
mined by migration and trade policy planners in the
ZAF 1/2006 21
EU, possibly in the context of local services markets.
A feature of the movement of such service providers
is that it will bring about a fragmentation in the pro-
vision of services, not dissimilar to the international
fragmentation of the production of manufactured
goods in the 1990s. In response, economic and la-
bour market policy will need to find ways to assist
those groups of workers who lose their jobs as a
result of increased specialisation inherent in the
process of fragmentation. Such assistance is very
likely to require further education and training to
facilitate intersectoral movement of labour.
6 Concluding observations
As migratory processes do not only have an eco-
nomic dimension but also political, cultural, social,
humanitarian and even strategic ones, it is particu-
larly difficult to anticipate fully the potential impact
of migration on Europe at a time of major changes,
both economic and social.
Policy coordination in the field of migration will be a
particularly challenging task, as a result of different
migration histories and models, which tend to dis-
criminate between immigrants from various regions
of the world. This results from the history of immi-
gration and the particular strategic and political ties
with the source countries of the major immigrant
groups, especially from former colonies.
National sovereignty is becoming increasingly weak-
ened. A series of EU regulations control cross-bor-
der migration. The Schengen agreement (of June
1990) is one pillar of legislation regulating security
matters. Others include the adaptation/convergence
of asylum procedures, the coordination of prosecu-
tion for illegal migration and clandestine work and
more recently the right to family reunification and
the free movement of permanent residents of third
countries.13
The reduction of illegal immigration will remain a
major challenge as long as the informal sector is
large and growing. Illegal work may be a rational
strategy for coping in a world of scarce formal-sec-
tor jobs. However, there is a risk of permanent de-
skilling for those workers who are effectively ex-
cluded from formal employment. This may seriously
13 For an overview of EU legislation en route to a common Euro-
pean Union immigration policy, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/
justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/printer/doc_immigration_
intro_en.htmTowards a common migration policy: potential impact on the EU economy Gudrun Biffl
impair the productive potential of EU member
states with large informal sectors.
A system of controlled migration is a prerequisite
for maximising the economic advantage associated
with migration. However, integration measures are
needed to complement migration . Even in cases of
temporary worker migration, integration measures
are an issue, in particular housing and language
courses, in order to promote social cohesion, one of
the main pillars of the Lisbon Agenda.
While migrants will have a role to play in alleviating
the problems linked with population ageing, the
eventual ageing of the migrants themselves will add
yet another dimension to the already daunting task
of providing adequate care for an ageing population.
The comparatively poor health of older migrants rel-
ative to natives implies that health care institutions
will be faced with caring for people with special
needs due to often chronic and multimorbid health
problems as well as different language and cultural
backgrounds. This may imply institutional adjust-
ments, e.g. intercultural training for care personnel,
medication and equipment.
Unlike earlier experience of the substantial South-
North migration in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the
opening up of CEECs was accompanied by rela-
tively small migration flows. Migration may play an
important role in economic integration in the future
but as a facilitator of specialised production proc-
esses and trade rather than as a substitute for trade.
In this context temporary migration and mode 4 ser-
vices mobility are a critical issue which has to be
resolved.
If immigration to the old EU member states contin-
ues to take place along traditional unskilled and
semi-skilled lines, it will not fit into the emerging
specialisation processes of industrial production and
economic integration and will most likely result in
increased unemployment of the less highly skilled.
These circumstances will not only limit potential
economic growth but will also contribute to rising
income inequality and endanger social cohesion.
The need for adjustment assistance is evident, one
element being a coherent approach by governments
and other relevant parties in the development of a
system of lifelong learning.
The development of a system of lifelong learning is
an important tool for raising and adapting the skill
base of the workforce and a major source of produc-
tivity growth. It is an integral part of the Lisbon
Agenda towards a productive knowledge society. It
may not suffice, however, to reduce the productivity
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gap between Europe and North America. The latter,
together with Australia, are more successful than
Europe in attracting the highly skilled, who almost
by definition contribute disproportionately to eco-
nomic and productivity growth. In that light, Europe
may have to rethink its migration policies and de-
velop better tools to attract and retain the highly
skilled.
In order for immigration to be accepted by the host
society, public education may be necessary to show
that there are economic advantages associated with
immigration/emigration. In this respect Europe
should learn from the traditional immigration coun-
tries overseas, where the media play an important
role in informing the general public about the eco-
nomic benefits accruing from immigration. How-
ever, this may partly be the result of a better in-
formed media, as research into the role of immigra-
tion in socio-economic development is abundant
and outcomes are readily available Ð a result of a
long tradition of generous funding of migration re-
search and a policy of transparency.
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